By Shaheen Sehbai
13-10-2006
Kargil: General Anthony Zinni's Version.
President General Pervez Musharraf has reignited the explosive and
controversial issue of Kargil by making direct and categorical
statements about his own role and that of the then prime minister,
Nawaz Sharif. The contradictory versions of these two leaders accuse
each other of lack of vision, leadership and courage. But the role of
the US in the conflict has been elaborated by the man in the middle,
the then commander-in- chief of the US Central Command (Centcom),
General Anthony Zinni, who penned down his version in a book after
his retirement.
Zinni's book, "Battle Ready" written with fiction writer Tom Clancy
and published by GP Putnam's Sons, a member of the Penguin Group in
May 2004, covers Zinni's career from Vietnam to Kargil and Pakistan
is mentioned in less than 10 pages scattered over the 450-page hard
cover edition. Zinni's account of Kargil is, however, detailed and
covers pages 346 to 350. Earlier he also devotes one page to
Pakistan 's position when in 1998 Nawaz Sharif was about to detonate
the nuclear bomb in response to the Indian test.
According to him America intervened decisively in 1999 to end the
Kargil stalemate between India and Pakistan and provided a face
saving exit to Nawaz Sharif. General Pervez Musharraf, according to
Zinni, "encouraged the then PM to hear out the US withdrawal
proposal". When Kargil took place General Zinni was sent on a special
mission to Pakistan by President Bill Clinton.
The Pakistan Army had at the time claimed that its troops were not
involved in Kargil and it were the Kashmiri Mujahideen who were
fighting but Zinni writes with full authority and knowledge that the
entire operation was carried out by the Pakistan forces. More proof
of this was, incidentally, provided in the Punjab Assembly on June 1,
when the provincial government placed data in the house stating that
2,000 acres of special land in Punjab had been allotted to the
Pakistan Army for distribution among the families of the troops
killed in the Kargil war.
General Zinni writes: "On the 21st of April, (1999) I traveled to
Pakistan for several days of meetings with the new Chief of Staff
General Pervez Musharraf. The two of us connected quickly and easily.
He was bright, sincere, and personable. A fervent nationalist who
nevertheless leaned toward the West, he was as appalled as General
Karamat over the ever-worsening corruption within the civilian
government.
"He also understood the various, powerful Islamist currents running
through his country, and saw them as the threats they were to
bringing his country into the twenty-first century; yet he also
understood that his country would never modernise and solve its
myriad ills without the emergence of some kind of religious
accommodation, and hopefully religious consensus.
"It was a great meeting, despite the chill cast by our sanctions. As
I was leaving, we both agreed to stay in close touch (we exchanged
our home telephone numbers). Our friendship would later prove to be
enormously valuable to both our countries.
"In May, Pakistani forces made a deep incursion into an area called
Kargil, on the Indian side of the Line of Control. Though there was
normally 'fighting' near the Line of Control, the area for a long
time had been quite stable. There would be probes and shooting during
the good months of the year, but nothing ever changed much; and in
wintertime, everybody would pull back down into the valleys, and the
two sides would create a 'no-man's-land' . As spring came, they would
go back up into their positions.
"Every so often, somebody on one side would be a little late getting
up to their spring position, and the other side could grab an
advantage of a kilometer or so. It was like "Aha, I've gotcha!" on a
tactical level. But it didn't really change things. This time,
however, the Pakistanis waylaid the Indians and penetrated all the
way to Kargil. This was such a deep, significant penetration that it
wasn't tactical; it threatened Indian lines of communication and
support up to Siachen glacier.
"The Indians came back with a vengeance. There were exchanges of
fire, there was a mobilization of forces, there were bombing attacks,
planes were shot down. Then the two sides started to mobilize all
their forces all along the line; and it was beginning to look like
the opening moves of a larger war. It got alarming.
"I was therefore directed by the administration to head a
presidential mission to Pakistan to convince Prime Minister Sharif
and General Musharraf to withdraw their forces from Kargil. I met
with the Pakistani leaders in Islamabad on June 24 and 25 and put
forth a simple rationale for withdrawing: "If you don't pull back,
you're going to bring war and nuclear annihilation down on your
country. That's going to be very bad news for everybody."
"Nobody actually quarreled with this rationale. The problem for the
Pakistani leadership was the apparent national loss of face. Backing
down and pulling back to the Line of Control looked like political
suicide. We needed to come up with a face-saving way out of this
mess. What we were able to offer was a meeting with President
Clinton, which would end the isolation that had long been the state
of affairs between our two countries, but we would announce the
meeting only after a withdrawal of forces. That got Musharraf's
attention and he encouraged Prime Minister Sharif to hear me out.
"Sharif was reluctant to withdraw before the meeting with Clinton was
announced (again, his problem was maintaining face); but after I
insisted, he finally came around and he ordered the withdrawal. We
set up a meeting with Clinton in July."
This is General Zinni's account of Kargil and what he says is the US
version of how things were perceived in Washington and how they were
settled. No matter what Nawaz Sharif or General Musharraf may claim,
the truth has to be sifted out from what the others have to say about
the issue and Zinni has given the most authentic third-party account.
Analysts and historians can now determine whether General Musharraf
has written the truth or what Nawaz Sharif has been saying is right.
--
The writer is a senior Washington-based Pakistani journalist Email:
ssehbai@hotmail. com